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are other specialized Councils of Ministers in areas such as transport which are
becoming GATT topics. It is possible that without changes these issues will also
be dealt with more from a narrow parochial point of view than from a general
Community perspective. In conclusion, in the 1980s the European Community has
become a better GATT citizen, but as GATT expands into new areas (or tries to
resolve old ones like agriculture), the European Community may find it difficult
to participate effectively and meaningfully because of these institutional problems.
REMARKS BY CYNTHIA C. LICHTENSTEIN*
Given our time constraints, I shall not describe here the content of the Delors
Report or the facts of progress toward European Monetary Union (EMU). (For
an excellent condensation of the Delors Report, including the proposed timetable
for the achievement of monetary union, see Ungerer, "Europe, the Quest for
Monetary Integration," 27 Finance and Development 14 (1990)). The Delors Re-
port is the White Paper authorized by the EC Council of Ministers on what should
be the Community goals for monetary union. Professor Davey has told you that
the European Community is a customs union, that trade moves freely among
member states. The Treaty of Rome, the Constitution of the EEC, however, did
not provide for the European Community to be a monetary union. The Delors
Report is only a study proposing the goals. No constitutional changes have as yet
been made; just what should be the legal form of such changes is under discussion.
Meetings that began in December are in effect a constitutional convention.
All one can say about progress toward EMU is that the European Community
member states are now in the stage that the states of the world were in when they
met in 1945 in San Francisco to consider moving toward a new system of world
order. At present there exists a number of drafts of possible constitutive structures
for a European central bank, which for the moment, because the Community is
having trouble envisioning a single central organ, is being called the European
system of central banks. That is the organ that is supposed to come into existence
in stage two under the Delors Report, due in January 1994.
The heart of the matter is whether the member states will cede to Community
institutions one of the ultimate bastions of state sovereignty-control over mone-
tary policy. Rather than talk about the Delors Report, I will describe how the
member states are now free to make their decisions in the monetary field, so that
it is clearjust what they will have to give up in order to get the benefits of monetary
union.
Consider the situation of the United States under our Constitution. Our states
have no right to create separate currencies or exercise exclusive control over
resources that can act as currencies, such as gold or oil. When our union shifted
from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution, the federal Congress was
granted the power to "coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
Coin." At that point the thirteen states of the Confederation forwent their control
over the money supply and over the rate of currency exchanges against currencies
of other states.
At present, all twelve EC member states are what is called "Article 4" Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) members; this means that they have promised not to
impose exchange restrictions upon current transactions. As anyone who has stud-
ied the Bretton Woods Agreement knows, that obligation is very much hedged.
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Utilizing the language of international trade, there are many "safeguard" clauses
as to when-if a country views itself as being in difficulty-it can in fact impose
exchange controls. What the Fund Agreement does achieve is to outlaw aggressive
use of exchange controls and currency manipulations as a means of furthering a
state's trade balance at the expense of other states. It does not forbid self-defense,
however.
It is true that ten of the twelve member states participate in a system called the
European Rate Mechanism (ERM) in which they hold exchange rates among their
currencies within a certain range. But once again, there is no obligation in the
Treaty of Rome or in the Single European Act for member states to join this
system, and Britain only entered it this past year. Furthermore, because partici-
pants in the ERM may withdraw, they have not really given up sovereignty by
participating in the system.
Article 4 of the Fund Agreement forbids exchange controls only on current
transactions; what about a state's capacity to defend itself by exchange controls
on "capital movements," "hot money" flows? As part of the creation of the single
market, the European Community has, as of July 1990, completely liberalized
capital movements. The member states have all said (through an EC Directive)
that they will no longer restrict their citizens in moving capital funds any place they
wish within (or indeed without) the Community. However, there is a "safeguard"
clause in the capital movements Directive as well, and a state is exempted from
its operation when it has problems controlling its monetary system because of
flows. While there is agreement in the Community's Second Banking Directive
for not restricting the entry of other member state banks and bank branches, once
again the Directive includes an exception for monetary purposes.
In short, so far none of the states of the Community has given up any control
over its monetary system. This is what will have to be negotiated to achieve
monetary union. The States will have to agree on the powers of a central bank
which will be able to lay down a common monetary policy. This is a far cry from
promises to coordinate exchange rate movements. When a union's central organ
determines its monetary policy, the value of the common currency and the rate at
which that common currency will attempt to exchange against "foreign coin,"
then that union has truly gone from a "confederation" to a federal union.
The Community, if it wants to have monetary union, will have to impose upon
its members a structure in which a system of central banks or one central bank
(however that system is controlled by the political organs) has the power to deter-
mine the total quantity of money. If such a central bank mechanism with the power
to determine the Community's total quantity of money could be set up, that would
be an extraordinary relinquishment of sovereignty by the member states, because
it means that they will have given up control over their own budgets.
The ultimate stage of monetary union will also mean a system of community
review of state budgets. Different drafts of the proposed system of central banks
do different things with this aspect. The Delors Report suggested creating general
rules for member states' about their budget processes. The EC Commission is
instead moving toward the system whereby the constitutional changes would in-
clude procedures by which limitations on member states' budget processes would
be achieved. Now it is possible to understand why Mrs. Thatcher was resistant to
the Delors Report. The British Prime Minister cannot always tell the Bank of
England exactly what to do, but he or she can guide it fairly well. Mrs. Thatcher
knew perfectly well that she would never be able to exercise that kind of power
over a common central bank; when she wanted to take the UK into the Falklands
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action, she would have had to figure out how to pay for it on Community terms.
Mrs. Thatcher understood that she would be giving up control over her own
money, and she said no. That is what the Community is considering: To what
extent are those twelve states going to turn over to Community organs fundamental
control over their own economies?
REMARKS BY CAROL F. LEE*
My topic today is "European Political Union-An Emerging Constitution."
This title, so it seems, is in keeping with the theme of this year's annual meeting:
"Continuity and Change." In April 1978, the Society's annual meeting featured a
panel on the subject of "The Emerging European Constitution." Now, thirteen
years later, the twelve member states of the European Community are engaged in
negotiations on something they call "political union." They hope to produce a
new treaty by the end of this year. Assuming that they do, the treaty will be yet
another step on the path to a true "European constitution."
What did the phrase, "the emerging European constitution," mean in 1978? The
chairman of the panel, Professor Eric Stein, admitted that he had selected a "ring-
ing title that might strike one as unrealistic and Pollyannaish, if not outright propa-
gandistic in more than one sense." Yet he defended the use of these words, relying
principally on the role that had been played in the Community's first two decades
by the European Court of Justice.
The Court had interpreted the basic Community treaties, in particular the 1957
Treaty of Rome, in a constitutional mode. If it had employed traditional interna-
tional law methodology, it would have focused on the specific intentions of the
signatories and would have construed derogations of sovereignty narrowly. In-
stead the Court of Justice insisted that the EEC Treaty had created "its own legal
system" whose rules were supreme over national laws, and even over national
constitutions. It held that national courts were obliged to enforce the provisions
of the Treaty, regardless of the status of treaty law in their own domestic legal
orders. And the Court interpreted the Treaty in order to create an effective, worka-
ble structure of Community law.
So, when panelists spoke about an "emerging European constitution" in 1978,
they were talking about judicial creativity. Today, the architects of the "emerging
European Community constitution" are diplomats and foreign ministers rather
than judges. It is beyond the capacity of even the most masterful of judges to
restructure the processes by which European Community legislation is enacted,
to create new institutions with legally binding authority, or to extend the Commu-
nity's power to act into areas from which it is expressly excluded by treaty. To
achieve these ends, treaty amendments are required. They must first be negotiated
by the European Community's member states and then ratified by the parliaments
of all the member states. That is the process that is generating the next stage in
the European Community's constitutional development.
The term "political union" may conjure up visions of a federated European
state with its own government and its own legislature, whose citizens are bound
together by a sense of common political allegiance. But, in European governmental
circles, "political union" actually means far less than that. It is a convenient
shorthand for an assortment of institutional reform proposals that would
strengthen the Community in areas other than economic and monetary union.
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